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This paper examines Francis Lieber’s concept of modern war as “public 
war” — in the Code he drafted for the 1863 Union Armies and in his earlier 
writings. Though Lieber was not the first to engage the distinction between 
private and public war, his treatment of modern war as exclusively public 
nevertheless deserves special attention. It became, in time, a foundational 
concept of the 19th Century effort to modernize and humanize the laws of 
war. Today, it remains embedded, albeit implicit, in contemporary 
international humanitarian law and its paradigmatic interstate war outlook.  
Yet Lieber’s public war definition was driven by the ideological 
sensibilities of his youth in Vormärz Germany: romantic nationalism, ardent 
republicanism, and profound faith in modernity and progress. It took 
normative form but was, essentially, an ideological assertion. Lieber’s 
public war definition sought to offer ideological justification for the modern 
nation State, its formation and existence. It also sought to construct and 
justify, again in ideological terms, the formation, existence, and preservation 
of an international order comprised of nation States; such order, alone, could 
meet the challenges of modern conditions. For Lieber, limiting war to 
nations and States alone was an ideological imperative of progressive 
civilization in the modern age.  
Reflection on Lieber’s public war definition suggest lines of inquiry 
that may produce a richer understanding of the intellectual foundations and 
ideological motivation of modern international law. At the same time, such 
inquiries compel historical, normative, and policy reconsideration of 
interstate paradigm of war and its costs. They also promise to enrich 
contemporary normative and policy debates about the regulation of 
privatized warfare and non-state actors.  
 
A. Introduction  
The 1863 Lieber Code1 — commissioned by the Union government 
and promulgated by President Lincoln in the midst of the Civil War — is 
frequently referred to as “the first modern codification of the law of war”.2 
 
1 F. Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Orders No. 100, War Dept., 24 April 1863 [Lieber Code]. 
2 R. R. Baxter, ‘The First Modern Codification of the Law of War: Francis Lieber and 
General Orders No. 100’, 25 International Review of the Red Cross (1963) 3, 171, 
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It has earned Lieber a place of honor among the founding fathers of modern 
international law, international humanitarian law (IHL) in particular.3 It is 
often cited as evidence for the progress of the idea of humanity in warfare as 
well as its immanence in human civilization.4 Its impact on the development 
of IHL is commonly noted. The precise detail, historical context, and 
ideological leanings of the Code (and those of its author) are, however, 
often lost in the noise of veneration. They are equally lost by indifference to 
what some consider as a normatively suspect authority: the product of a 
private person stemming, at that, out of a civil war.5  
Veneration and indifference miss out, for example, the unique sense of 
humanity running through the Code — one that on close scrutiny appears 
quite unrelated, at times even reactionary to contemporary understandings 
of humanity in warfare.6 Another (closely related) aspect of the Code that 
often goes unnoticed is the ideological vision of the international order it 
expressed. Still related, a third aspect of the Code that has drawn far less 
attention than it deserves is Lieber’s war definition. The Code — as well as 
Lieber’s earlier and later work — systematically promotes a legal 
understanding of modern war as war by States alone.7 Consider, for 
example, Article 20: 
  
“Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign 
nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized 
existence that men live in political, continuous societies, 
forming organized units, called states or nations, whose 
 
171; “The ‘Lieber Instructions’ represent the first attempt to codify the laws of war”: 
D. Schindler & J. Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed Conflicts (1988), 3.  
3 E. Root, ‘Francis Lieber’, 7 American Journal of International Law (1913) 3, 453.  
4 Such views of the Lieber Code are traced in R. Giladi, ‘A Different Sense of 
Humanity: Occupation in Francis Lieber’s Code’, 94 International Review of the Red 
Cross (forthcoming, 2012) [Giladi, A Different Sense]; in id., ‘Rites of Affirmation: 
Progress and Immanence in International Humanitarian Law Historiography’ 
(unpublished manuscript) [Giladi, Rites], I explore such trends against a broader 
historiographic context.  
5 Giladi, A Different Sense, supra note 4. 
6 This is the core claim I make id.  
7 It is important to stress at this point that although commissioned in the US Civil War 
context, the Code was meant to and did regulate “regular war”; its tenth chapter on 
“Insurrection — Civil war — Rebellion” was a late addition derelished by Lieber. I 
present evidence for the Code’s relevance for interstate war in id.  
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constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, 
in peace and in war.” 
  
Today, the first sentence appears self-evident. Notwithstanding a 
growing corpus of rules regulating non-international armed conflict, the 
proliferation of non-state actors, or debates on the privatization of war, 
international law continues to view war, paradigmatically, as interstate 
business. Other categories of belligerents or participants in political violence 
— militias, national liberation movements or private military companies, to 
name a few — are assessed, regulated, included or excluded based on their 
affiliation or similarity to State actors exercising a public function.8 The 
Code’s frequent reference to modern times, modern wars, modern nations, 
and modern law9 implies, however, that this has not always been the case. It 
implies that the right to war, and consequently rights in war, may have in 
the past existed independently of state-affiliation and held by actors who 
were not States. The public, state-oriented nature of war, in short, is perhaps 
more of a modern innovation than commonly assumed today.10  
History — to a limited extent, international legal history — tells us of 
the phenomenon of private war.11 While the expression “private war” does 
 
8 Consider in this regard: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, 12 August 1949, Arts 2 & 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136, 138, 140 [Third Geneva 
Convention]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 
Arts 1(4), 43-45 & 96(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7, 23-24, 46 [Additional Protocol I]; and 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Art. 1, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [Additional Protocol II]. As G. Blum, ‘On a Differential Law of 
War’, 52 Harvard International Law Journal (2011) 1, 163, 169 observes, discussing 
Art. 1(4) of API, “The expansion of the regime to these types of armed conflicts 
further demonstrates, rather than weakens, the pro-state bias of the IHL system, as in 
all these cases, the non-state actors are those fighting on behalf of states-in-the-
making.”  
9 The word “modern” appears in Code fifteen times: see Arts 14, 15, 25, 29, 30, 45, 60, 
68, 70, 80, & 148.  
10 Cf. S. C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (2005), 13 suggesting 
that “[p]erhaps the single most obvious and widely agreed feature of war, throughout 
its long history, has been its character as a public and collective enterprise […]”. This 
appears contradictory with much of the evidence cited below.  
11 Without attempting to define this concept, one may usefully consider the diffuse 
entitlement to wage war in feudal systems as a salient example: J. Firnhaber-Baker, 
‘Seigneurial War and Royal Power in Later Medieval Southern France’, 208 Past and 
Present (2010) 1, 37. See Part E below.  
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not appear in the Code, its presence as the contradistinction of “public war” 
is very much felt.12 Examining Lieber’s war definition, in particular its 
limitation to one class of public actor (“sovereign nations or governments”), 
is necessary if we are to understand the underpinnings of the international 
legal transformation from private to public war. It can equally inform our 
understanding of the limited regulatory reach of international law today, and 
contemporary debates about the law’s relevance to non-state actors.  
At the same time, familiarity with Lieber’s war definition promises to 
facilitate our understanding of the ideological aspects of the formation of the 
international legal order which in and since the second half of the 19th 
Century. Having survived the twentieth Century (less so, perhaps, legal 
positivism), we may tend to gloss over the second sentence of Article 20 as 
an arcane, outdated style of writing that has no place in truly modern, 
codified forms of international law. But the Code’s frequent allusions to 
modernity, civilization, or progress suggest such language expresses 
ideological preferences. A close reading of the Code in light of Lieber’s 
other works demonstrates just how important are such ideological 
preferences for the understanding of Lieber’s war definition. It 
demonstrates, moreover, that Lieber’s war definition was itself an 
ideological assertion.  
This paper, then, explores some of the intellectual and ideological 
aspects of Lieber’s definition of public war exclusively limited to one class 
of participants: the modern nation State. It starts at the end: Part B. identifies 
implicit and explicit iterations of the public character of war since the 
Lieber Code. It demonstrates how the public character of war, following 
Lieber, in practice served as the conceptual stepping-stone of the laws of 
war/IHL — to this day. I also show that, with time, the public character of 
war became implicit in positive law, acquiring a technical appearance. This 
helped conceal the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the public 
character of modern war. Part C examines in detail Lieber’s war definition. 
It reads relevant Code provisions in light of his other works, preceding and 
following the Code’s promulgation. I show that what marks the Code from 
earlier elaborations of the distinction between private and public war was 
that it used that distinction as a controlling principle of a systematic positive 
regulation. Lieber’s war definition offered, in addition, ideological 
justifications for the formation and existence of the modern nation State; it 
 
12 E.g. in discussing private relations (Arts 23 & 25), private revenge (Art. 11), or 
individual gain (Art. 11).  
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sought to construct and justify, along ideological lines, the formation, 
existence, and preservation of an international order for the modern age of 
nation States.  
Part D. briefly ponders the various sources that combined to form 
Lieber’s public war definition, suggesting that primarily, it was driven by 
ideological convictions formed during Lieber’s youth in Vormärz Germany. 
Part E. discusses some of the many implications of Lieber’s public war 
theory and identifies new research directions.  
B. Public War Since the Lieber Code  
Lieber’s contribution to subsequent codification and development of 
the laws of war is commonly acknowledged.13 It had served as inspiration 
for other commentators and countries.14 It also served as a base text in 
subsequent codification attempts of the laws of war: the 1874 Brussels 
Declaration,15 the 1880 Oxford Manual,16 and the 1899 Hague Convention 
II.17 In the course of the proceedings which produced the latter, F. F. 
 
13 Baxter, supra note 2, 183; J. C. Bluntschli, ‘Lieber’s Service to Political Science and 
International Law’, in D. C. Gilman (ed.), The Miscellaneous Writings of Francis 
Lieber, Vol. II (1881), 12; D. A. Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent 
Occupation 1863-1914 (1949), 17-20; T. E. Holland, The Laws of War on Land 
(1908), 72-73; T. Meron, ‘Francis Lieber’s Code and Principles of Humanity’, 36 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) 1/2, 269, 274; E. Nys, ‘Francis 
Lieber: His Life and His Work, 5 American Journal of International Law (1911) 1/2, 
84, 379-80; Root, supra note 3, 453 & the annex, 466-469: G. B. Davis, 
‘Memorandum Showing the Relation between General Orders No. 100 and The Hague 
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land’; R. Sallet, ‘On 
Francis Lieber and His Contribution to the Law of Nations of Today’, in Göttinger 
Arbeitskreis (ed.), Recht im Dienste der Menschenwürde: Festschrift für Herbert 
Kraus (1964), 279; S. Vöneky, ‘Lieber and the Evolution of the Laws of War’, 62 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2002), 423.  
14 Id.; B. Röben, Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Francis Lieber und das Moderne 
Völkerrecht 1861-1881.  
15 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, 
Brussels, 27 August 1874, in D. Schindler & J. Toman (eds), The Laws of Armed 
Conflicts, 4th ed. (2004), 27.  
16 International Law Institute, ‘The Laws of War on Land’, in Schindler & Toman, supra 
note 15, 29.  
17 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, 
187 C.T.S. 429 [Hague Convention II]; K. Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation 
Resistance, and the Law (1999), 5, whose first chapter provides a useful brief 
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Martens, the Russian jurist-diplomat, invoked the precedent of the Lieber 
Code as the example which Alexander II followed when taking “the 
initiative in convoking the Brussels Conference of 1874”: 
  
“The initiative of my august sovereign was not all due to a new 
idea. Already during the War of Secession, had President 
Lincoln directed Professor Lieber to prepare instructions for the 
armies of General Grant [...] Those are circumstances in which 
the very force of events called forth the idea of regulating the 
laws of war. The example had been set. The Brussels 
Declaration brought about by Alexander II was the logical and 
natural development thereof.”18 
 
The Brussels Declaration, though its language often clearly borrowed 
from the Lieber Code, did not discuss public or private war. But it enacted 
the limitation of war to public parties. Under the heading “Who should be 
recognized as belligerents: combatants and non-combatants”, Article 9 
expressed the view that the law of war, rights and duties in war and, 
implicitly, the right to wage war itself were all limited to state-parties. Like 
its progeny (e.g. Art. 4, Third Geneva Convention, 1949), Article 9 
prescribed conditions requiring other actors to be affiliated with, or operate 
like States armies: 
  
“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, 
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following 
conditions:  
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates;  
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 
distance;  
3. That they carry arms openly; and  
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war.  
 
description of the development of the laws of war in the 19th and early 20th Century.  
18 J. B. Scott (ed.), The Proceedings of The Hague Peace Conferences: Translation of 
the Official Texts (1920), 505-506 [Scott, Proceedings]. For context, see R. Giladi, 
‘The Enactment of Irony: Reflections on the Origins of the Martens Clause’, 
European Journal of International Law (forthcoming, 2013) [Giladi, Enactment of 
Irony].  
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In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it, 
they are included under the denomination ‘army’.”  
  
The drafters of the unratified Brussels Declaration were State 
representatives. Evidently, they saw no need to elaborate on the underlying 
assumptions of Article 9. Nonetheless, Article 9 was premised on a notion 
of war akin to Lieber’s. This was obvious to Gustave Moynier, the ICRC 
President, who in 1880 prepared a commentary on the Brussels draft for the 
Institut de Droit international (IDI). The resulting Oxford Manual, a 
“statement of reasons” for the rules enunciated in the Brussels Declaration, 
begun with a statement of “General Principles”. Article 1, containing the 
first of these, stated: 
  
“The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save 
between the armed forces of belligerent States. Persons not 
forming part of a belligerent armed force should abstain from 
such acts.” 
 
The right to wage war, in other words, was limited to the armed forces 
of belligerent States. Only then did Moynier proceed to restate and 
somewhat elaborate, in Article 2, the terms of Article 9 of the Brussels 
Declaration: 
  
“The armed force of a State includes:  
1. The army properly so called, including the militia;  
2. The national guards, landsturm, free corps, and other bodies 
which fulfil the three following conditions […]”19 
  
Twenty-five years later, the First Hague Peace Conference repeated, 
almost verbatim, the language of Article 9 of the Brussels text.20 Although 
the language was the subject of fierce debate, this did not concern the 
principle of limitation of war rights to public actors. Rather, the controversy 
was about the practical translation of the principle to the specific 
 
19 Moynier, rather than set the condition of conforming with the laws of war, stated it as 
a duty binding on “[e]very belligerent armed force”. Both the Brussels and Oxford 
text recognized an important but limited exception of the rights of noncombatants to 
use force: levée en masse.  
20 In Art. 1 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention II.  
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circumstances of resistance to the occupier.21 The language remained 
practically unchanged, but again, the subject-matter of the principle 
acquired a technical aspect: it was no longer, as in the Oxford Manual, a 
statement of a “general principle”. This, too, was reversion to the Brussels 
Declaration, where the public character of war was implicit in the question 
of “Who should be recognized as belligerents: combatants and non-
combatants”. In both versions of the Hague Regulations, the heading under 
which the provision was inserted was “The qualifications of belligerents”.22 
This will remain the case with future applications of the principle, in Article 
4 of the Third Geneva Convention or in Additional Protocol I. And although 
none of these instruments gave explicit credit to Lieber’s principled 
limitation of the right to wage war, they all, in practice, put it into operation. 
All were premised, in other words, on the conception of war as, primarily, a 
relationship “between sovereign nations or governments”.23  
In short, the 19th Century project to modernize the laws of war, to 
humanize war through legal restraints, and to introduce “humanity in 
warfare”, proceeded on the basis of the assumption that restraint starts with, 
and is only possible, limiting legitimate violence to States alone. This 
assumption is today expressed in traditional conditions required for 
belligerent status. These are modeled after the organizational forms of State 
armies precisely because such organization is required, so it is assumed, for 
compliance with IHL. At its historical outset and intellectual point of 
departure, and notwithstanding the subsequent development of the 
distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum, the IHL project draws a 
foundational distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence based 
on the identity of its authors. Today, experience may help us question 
whether or not the limitation of legitimate violence to States alone in fact 
help restrain the conduct of war. Yet to understand this assumption and its 
provenance we must turn to the Lieber Code and the ideology driving its 
author.  
 
21 Giladi, Enactment of Irony, supra note 18. See Scott, Proceedings, supra note 18, 54-
55, 419-420 (similarity to Art. 9), 548-549 (resistance).  
22 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 205 
C.T.S. 277 [Hague Convention IV].  
23 Art. 20 Lieber Code, supra note 1. 
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C. Lieber on Public War  
Lieber was not the first to draw a distinction between public and 
private war; classical writers on the law of nations and greater and lesser 
lights of the Enlightenment have done so for more than two centuries before 
him.24 Nor was he the first to advocate the legitimacy of the latter or brand 
the illegitimacy of the former.25 Other publicists have so argued before him, 
to various degrees and with varying forcefulness. Rousseau’s famous 
definition of war as “a relation, not between man and man, but between 
State and State” is one such example: for it is accompanied by the rarely-
noted observation that 
  
“[i]ndividual combats, duels and encounters, are acts which 
cannot constitute a state; while the private wars, authorised by 
the Establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended 
by the Peace of God, are abuses of feudalism, in itself an absurd 
system if ever there was one, and contrary to the principles of 
natural right and to all good polity.”26 
  
Two matters, however, distinguish Lieber’s public war definition from 
those who engaged the distinction between private and public war before 
him. First, in the Code and in Lieber’s other work, the public aspect of war 
is not a casual remark on its character. Rather, the limitation of modern war 
 
24 On the enlightenment and the laws of war, see G. Best, Humanity in Warfare (1980). 
Vitoria normally limited war rights to sovereigns. While arguing for a very limited 
private right to self-defense, he did exclude it from the definition of “war”: J. B. Scott, 
The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of 
Nations (1934), 150. See also D. Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’, 27 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1986) 1, 1, 31-35. Grotius, by contrast, advocated the 
justness of private war causes – more openly in his earlier writings but still noticeable 
in his latter works: M. J. van Ittersum, ‘Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck’s 
Capture of the Santa Catarina and its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604–1606)’, 
31 Asian Journal of Social Science (2003) 3, 511; id., Profit and Principle: Hugo 
Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 
(1595-1615) (2006).  
25 Nabulsi, supra note 17, 77 suggests that “As the Grotian tradition was ‘index-linked’ 
to legitimate power, its central ambition was to limit the rights of belligerency to a 
particular class of participant (the soldier), and to exclude all others from the right to 
become actively involved in political violence in times of war.” 
26 Emphasis added; J-J. Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right’ 
(1762), in G. D. H. Cole (ed.), Rousseau’s Social Contract and Discourses (1923), 11.  
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to States alone formed part of a systematic positive regulation.27 In the 
Code, it served as a yardstick justifying resort to war or its denunciation and 
censure. The Code’s public character of war, moreover, was the source of 
restraints on the conduct of belligerents or what made such conduct 
permissible. With Lieber, the definition of war as an assertion of legal State 
monopoly over the use of (external) violence had left the realm of political 
philosophy and entered the realm of codified, positive law.28 This was, 
perhaps, the most important aspect of Lieber’s impact on subsequent 
evolution and codification. Second, as we shall see, Lieber’s public war 
definition formed a crucial part of an overall ideological vision, however 
naïve or misguided, of a modern international law for the age of nation 
States.  
I. The Public Ends of War  
First, there is the place of Lieber’s war definition in the systematic 
regulation of the laws of war. In this respect, the first sentence of Article 20 
only States the principle by way of definition: “Public war is a state of 
armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments”.29 That war 
definition underscores, in turn, many of the Code’s provisions.  
 
27 Lieber did not devise rules “ad hoc, but rather based them on his own systematic 
interpretation of war and international law”: J. F. Childress, ‘Francis Lieber’s 
Interpretation of the Laws of War: General Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life 
and Thought’, 21 American Journal of Jurisprudence (1976) 1, 34, 39-40; the Code 
represented “a mature and logically consistent system, developed and systematized 
over many years of thinking and teaching”: Baxter, supra note 1, 250.  
28 I explore this notion in Part E. Notably, the Paris Declaration, which purported to 
codify a ban on privateering, preceded the Lieber Code. Nonetheless, the Code’s 
public war definition was based on Lieber’s works preceding 1856: Paris Declaration 
Respecting Maritime Law, 16 April 1856, 155.  
29 The consequent limitation of war rights to States is spelled out in Art. 67, first 
sentence (“The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon 
another sovereign state […].”).  
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1. The Public Instrumentality of War 
War, for Lieber, was instrumental. Following Clausewitz, Lieber 
considered war as a means to an end.30 The instrumental nature of war is 
explicitly stated in Articles 30 and 68 of the Code: 
  
“30. Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern 
nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, 
war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the 
means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defense 
against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes 
adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law 
of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles 
of justice, faith, and honor. 
 
68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing 
of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in 
modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain 
that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war. 
Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.” 
  
 It is noteworthy that, according to these provisions, modern war is 
not instrumental to just any ends. It is, rather, instrumental to public, 
national, State ends: “great national wars” are but “means to obtain great 
ends of state”. “Modern wars are not internecine wars” precisely because 
they were means to public ends. In the Code as in Lieber’s other writings, 
war’s instrumentality to public ends was one of the primary yardstick 
measuring its permissibility and, at the same time, the permissibility of 
measures taken in its pursuit.31 The language of both articles clearly 
indicates that the public, or national, ends of war are the basis of 
“limitations and restrictions” imposed by law of war (Article 30). Modern 
war, and the destruction of values in modern war, was lawful precisely 
because it did not go beyond what the object requires (Article 68). War 
 
30 On Clausewitzian construction of war in the formation of the modern law of war, see 
R. Giladi, ‘Reflections on Proportionality, Military Necessity, and the Clausewitzian 
War’, 45 Israel Law Review (2012) 2, 323.  
31 Other yardsticks used by Lieber to justify and restrain war were war’s finality and its 
service to the international order as described by Lieber: Giladi, A Different Sense, 
supra note 4. 
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itself was justified by its service to the ends of nations.32 The ends of 
nations, politically organized in States, justified in turn destruction and 
suffering in war.  
In the Lieber Code, the instrumentality of war to public ends (as well 
as to the finality of war and to the international order described by Lieber) 
constituted the controlling principle of legality.33 It was, moreover, the sole 
principle controlling legality: the instrumentality of war to national ends, in 
Article 30, meant that “no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to 
injure the enemy is any longer admitted”.34  
In Lieber’s writing, the public ends of war served to limit war conduct 
and, at the same time, justify such conduct serving such ends. Public — that 
is, national — ends provided equal justification for destruction and human 
suffering in war. In essence, what was necessary for the pursuit of public 
ends of war was permissible; that which was not, was unlawful. Thus, in 
Article 14 
  
“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 
consists in the necessity of those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are 
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”35 
 
And, as Lieber wrote in 1861, in a short text laying out the essence of 
his concept of war: 
 
 
32 Hence Lieber’s critique of past cabinet wars: F. Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics: 
Designed Chiefly for the Use of Colleges and Students at Law, Vol. I (1838), 441 
[Lieber, Political Ethics I].  
33 Together with the finality of war and service to order: see Giladi, A Different Sense, 
supra note 4. 
34 It can be argued that the last words of Art. 14 attest to the existence of additional 
limitations on belligerents: see, e.g., B. M. Carnahan, ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws 
of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity’, 92 American 
Journal of International Law (1998) 2, 213, 218. Why this interpretation is 
inconsistent with the Code’s system and other writings is discussed in Giladi, A 
Different Sense, supra note 4; see also Art. 40: “There exists no law or body of 
authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of 
nature and nations which is called the law and usages of war on land”.  
35 Emphasis added.  
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“War being a physical contest, yet man remaining forever a 
moral and a rational being, and peace being the ultimate object 
of war, the following four conditions result:  
[…]  
b. All means to injure the enemy so far as [they?] deprive him of 
power to injure us or to force him to submit to the conditions 
desired by us are allowed to be resorted to, but  
c. Only so far as necessary for this object […]”36 
  
This was not a principle elaborated by Lieber for the American Civil 
War: rather, like most of the Code, it was formulated more than twenty 
years earlier, in his two-volume Manual of Political Ethics (1838-1839): 
“the injury done in war beyond the necessity of war is at once illegitimate, 
barbarous, or cruel”.37 Elsewhere in Political Ethics Lieber elaborated on 
the license and limits of public ends: 
  
“I have not the right to injure my enemy privately, that is, 
without reference to the general object of the war, or the general 
object of the battle. We do not injure in war, in order to injure, 
but to obtain the object of war. All cruelty, that is, unnecessary 
infliction of suffering, therefore, remains cruelty as among 
private individuals. All suffering inflicted upon persons who do 
not impede my way, for instance surgeons, or of inoffensive 
persons, if it can possibly be avoided, is criminal; all turning the 
public war to private ends […] as, for instance, the satisfaction 
of lust; the unnecessary destruction of private property is 
criminal […] for I do not do it as public enemy, because it is not 
serviceable to the general object of war, it is not use, but abuse 
 
36 F. Lieber, Twenty Seven Definitions and Elementary Positions Concerning the Law 
and Usages of War (1861), manuscript in Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. Box 2, Folder 15, § 14 [Lieber, Definitions]. I 
wish to thank the staff of the Eisenhower Library for help in obtaining Lieber’s 
papers. Art. 15, elaborating on what military necessity admits, concludes with a 
similar – yet explicitly “public” – formula: “Men who take up arms against one 
another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to 
one another and to God.”  
37 F. Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics: Designed Chiefly for the Use of Colleges and 
Students at Law, Vol. II (1839), 663 [Lieber, Political Ethics II]. 
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of arms, which, nevertheless, I only carry in consequence of that 
public war.”38 
2. Private Ends in War  
In the Code, the denunciation of private ends in war was therefore a 
logical corollary. If war practices were permissible because of their service 
to public ends, that which served private ends was impermissible. 
Permissible injury to the enemy flowed from “that which serves the public 
good, and what is not allowed is that which serves private ends”.39 The 
Code consistently ruled out private ends. Under Article 11, the “law of war 
[…] disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; all 
acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts”. Such acts should be 
“severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers”. Article 46 
also prohibited “private gain”: 
  
“Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their 
position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not 
even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses 
to the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be 
punished with cashiering or such other punishment as the nature 
of the offense may require; if by soldiers, they shall be punished 
according to the nature of the offense.”40 
  
And a number of provisions made “unnecessary”, “wanton”, or 
unauthorized violence, devastation, destruction or injury impermissible: 
these do not serve public ends.41  
Lieber’s other works reveal, however, that the denunciation of private 
ends in war — and private war itself — was more than a logical corollary of 
public justification. It was also an ideological assertion informed by 
historical interpretation, and standing in its own right. In the Manual of 
Political Ethics, he exposed the modern, explicitly republican, reasoning for 
 
38 Id., 659; see also Childress, supra note 27, 57. 
39 J. T. Johnson, ‘Lieber and the Theory of War’, in C. Mack & H. H. Lesesne (eds), 
Francis Lieber and the Culture of the Mind (2005), 61, 63.  
40 See also Art. 36, stipulating that no “works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments 
belonging to a hostile nation or government […]. In no case they ever be privately 
appropriated […]”.  
41 Consider, e.g., Arts 16, 36, 44.  
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rejecting private war: private causes concerned “lust”,42 i.e. emotion and not 
reason:  
 
“Formerly, when there were so many wars […] frequently were 
undertaken for trifling or unjust causes, it was natural that many 
niceties should be considered as laws of war. Wars were 
somewhat like duels, or tournaments, and the [laws] which 
regulated them were carried over to the wars. Certain arms, 
advantages, and means of destruction were declared to be 
unlawful, or not considered honorable. The “Chevalier” lost his 
battle against king George, because he thought it unfair to take 
advantage of the battle ground! When nations are aggressed in 
their good rights, and threatened with the moral and physical 
calamities of conquest, they are bound to resort to all means of 
destruction, for they only want to repel.”43 
 
Yet, trifling nature of the former (causes of) wars aside, this passage 
indicates that Lieber’s legitimating of public war and the denunciation of 
private war had another reason. Modern wars, Lieber constantly advocated, 
were scarcer, shorter, and less destructive than pre-modern wars: the 
“gigantic wars of modern times” he advocated, unaware of what the future 
would bring, “are less destructive than were the protracted former ones, or 
the unceasing feudal turbulence”.44 Hence his derision of past wars by 
private and “petty sovereigns”, nobility and men of cloth.45 The same 
sentiment rings in the entry “War, Private, or Club-Law” in the 
Encyclopedia Americana. This was the first of his New World great projects 
 
42 Supra note 38.  
43 Lieber, Political Ethics II, supra note 37, 660-661. Similarly in id., Definitions, supra 
note 36, § 12, Lieber defines combatants by the public power they exercise, noting 
that “Wars and battles are not duals, nor appeals to the deity to decide by the award of 
victory who is right”.  
44 Id., Political Ethics II, supra note 37, 660; see also id., Definitions, supra note 36, § 
19. Why he translated this observation to a humanitarian imperative of “vigorous” 
pursuit of modern wars in Art. 29 exceeds the scope of this article: “I am not only 
allowed […] but it is my duty to injure my enemy, as enemy, the most seriously I can, 
in order to obtain my end […]. The more actively this rule is followed out the better 
for humanity, because intense wars are of short duration. If destruction of my enemy 
is my object, it is not only right, but my duty, to resort to the most destructive means”: 
id., Political Ethics II, supra note 37, 660.  
45 Id.  
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and, most likely, he had written that entry himself: it speaks of “this 
pernicious custom” and “these bloody feuds”.46  
II. Public War and the Inter-National Order  
This brings us to the second matter of note in the Code’s language on 
the public character of war. It is also what marks Lieber’s war definition 
from previous elaborations of the distinction between private and public 
war. For Lieber, public ends served to license and limit conduct of war. But 
this controlling principle of the Code was more than an extreme version of 
Kriegsraison.47 Lieber’s construction of war as an interstate affair went 
beyond an observation on the changing nature of war in human history. For 
Lieber, it was more than just the conceptual stepping-stone for a systematic 
intellectual effort to limit the frequency or inhumanity of war. Rejecting 
private reason for public reason was also a writ of republican ideology that 
viewed the modern nation State as “the glory of man”.48 Lieber’s war 
definition offered an ideological justification for the formation and existence 
of the modern nation State. It sought, in addition, to construct and justify, 
along ideological lines, the formation, existence, and preservation of an 
international society comprised by nation States. The ultimate telos of 
Lieber’s war definition, and the ideology driving it, was the modern, 
international order.  
This concern for what Lieber came to call, with the crucial dash, the 
“inter-national”,49 is manifest in the Code itself. It gives meaning to what 
otherwise appears arcane language that has no place in a modern code of 
law, or in a modern legal definition of war. Consider again the language of 
Articles 20, 29 and 30: 
 
46 Id. (ed.), Encyclopedia Americana: A Popular Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, 
Literature, Politics and Biography, Brought Down to the Present Time etc., Vol. XIII 
(1840), 64. For Lieber’s involvement in this project, see F. B. Freidel, Francis Lieber: 
A Nineteenth Century Liberal (1947), 63-81 [Freidel, Lieber].  
47 P. Bordwell, The Law War Between Belligerents (1908), 74; for a Confederate critique 
of the Code’s excesses, see J. A. Seddon to R. Ould, 24 January 1863, in R. S. 
Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (1983), 120. On Kriegsraison see C. 
Jochnick & R. Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the 
Laws of War’, 35 Harvard International Law Journal (1994) 1, 49.  
48 Lieber, Political Ethics I, supra note 32, 183. For an account of the role of republican 
ideology in the formation of the laws of war, see Nabulsi, supra note 17.  
49 F. Lieber, Fragments of Political Science on Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism 
(1868) [Lieber, Fragments].  





Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign 
nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized 
existence that men live in political, continuous societies, 
forming organized units, called states or nations, whose 
constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together, 
in peace and in war. 
  
Article 29  
Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the 
existence, at one and the same time, of many nations and great 
governments related to one another in close intercourse. Peace is 
their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object 
of all modern war is a renewed state of peace. The more 
vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp 
wars are brief.  
 
Article 30  
Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and 
ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come 
to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to 
obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defense against wrong; 
and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure 
the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law of war imposes 
many limitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, 
and honor.” 
  
 For Lieber, the inter-national order — the “formation and 
coexistence of modern nations”, “of many nations and great governments 
related to one another in close intercourse” — was both a historical 
observation and legal, political, and moral imperative whose creed was 
progress: the advancement of human civilization. If the nation was the only 
form “adequate” to meet “the high demands of modern civilization” 
within,50 the inter-national order was the only form of political organization 
adequate to meet the challenge of modern times without.  
 
50 Lieber, Political Ethics I, supra note 32, 179; id., Fragments, supra note 49, 5 & 8.  
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Lieber saw no tension between nationalism and inter-nationalism; on 
the contrary, he considered the existence of national States a necessary 
condition for inter-national order in which civilization can advance. Thus, 
addressing “Nationalism and Inter-Nationalism” a few short years after the 
Code, he noted “The Political Characteristic of Our Age”. Thus, he wrote, 
“the political development which mark[s] the modern epoch” included “The 
national polity” and  
 
“[t]he decree that has gone forth that many leading nations 
flourish at one and the same time, plainly distinguished from 
one another, yet striving together, with one public opinion, 
under the protection of one law of nations, and in the bonds of 
one common moving civilization.”51 
 
The inter-national order was no accident of history: the “multiplicity 
of civilized nations [with] their distinct independence” — was one of “the 
great safeguards of our civilization”. The virtue of the inter-national order 
was its ability to create the conditions necessary to meet the demands of the 
age, the quest “the Spreading Progress of our Kind” — and preserve these 
conditions. The modern inter-national order — the existence of many nation 
States — was a guarantee against a total war that would encompass and 
consume European civilization entirely, or the threat of hegemony and an 
“enslaving Universal Monarchy”.52 “Modern nations of our family”, 
members of “one common moving civilization”, were bonded by “their 
increasing resemblance and agreement” which produce legal, cultural, 
scientific, and political unities among them.53 Inter-nationalization was not a 
fixed condition but an ongoing, self-preserving process whose end result 
was not the “obliteration of nationalities”; these were requisite for a 
“moving civilization”, for if that happened, “civilization would be seriously 
injured. Hegemonies of ‘ancient times’ were short lived. Once declining, 
 
51 Id., 19-20 (other forms of international order dismissed as “obsolete”: “universal 
monarchy […]”; a “single leading nation; an agglomeration of States without a 
fundamental law, with the mere leadership or hegemony of one State or another, 
which always leads to Peloponnesian wars; regular confederacies of petty sovereigns; 
[…] all these are obsolete ideas, wholly insufficient for the demands of advanced 
civilization, and attempts at their renewal have led and must lead to ruinous results 
[…].”). 
52 Id., 21 (multiplicity), 20 (safeguard), 5 (progress), 20 (monarchy) clearly a reference 
to Napoleonic empire. 
53 Id., 19-21. See also id., Definitions, supra note 36, § 8. 
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they never recovered […]. Modern nations by contrast are long-lived, and 
possess recuperative energy […].”54 
Lieber’s man was a rational being who “consciously work[s] out his 
own perfection; that is, the development of his own humanity.” Such 
development could only take place in society organized, in modern times, in 
a nation State. Only the State could achieve the “great ends of humanity”.55 
For Lieber, the modern nation State, and the modern inter-national order, 
were as expressive of man’s humanity as his faculty of reason.56 Humanity, 
as an observed condition, gave rise to humanity as a calling. The existence 
of an inter-national society of modern nation States was innate in and 
expressive of human nature, just as the existence of the nation State was. 
The national and inter-national societies were, on different scales, two 
manifestation of the same attribute, two applica tions of the same principle 
of self-government, and both were geared towards the same vocation of the 
progress of civilization.57  
And if, within a State, it was the role of government to preserve order 
by supplying protection against undue interference with liberty, protection 
against interference within the inter-national society was the role of inter-
national law.58 Inter-national law, really, was equivalent to government: 
protecting and restraining nation States, it was an empire overseeing their 
relations.59 Rather than a product of sovereign States, law was the source of 
 
54 Id., Fragments, supra note 49, 21. See analysis by M. Curti, ‘Francis Lieber and 
Nationalism’, 4 Huntington Library Quarterly (1941) 3, 263, 270-271.  
55 Lieber, Political Ethics I, supra note 32, 3 (rationality), 63 (development of 
humanity).  
56 Giladi, A Different Sense, supra note 4. 
57 One of the fundamental principles of Lieber’s inter-national law is the “all-pervading 
law of interdependence, without which men would never have felt compelled to form 
society […] inter-dependence which like all original characteristics of humanity, 
increases in intensity and spreads in action as men advance, — this divine law of 
inter-dependence applies to nations quite as much as to individuals”: Lieber, 
Fragments, supra note 49, 22. 
58 Id., 22 (“Without the law of nations […] which […] is at once the manly idea of self-
government applied to a number of independent nations in close relation with one 
another, and the application of the fundamental law of Good Neighborhood, and the 
comprehensive law of Nuisance, flowing from it, to vast national societies, wholly 
independent, sovereign, yet bound together by a thousand ties”). 
59 “The civilized nations have come to constitute a community of nations, and are daily 
forming more and more, a commonwealth of nations, under the restraint and 
protection of the law of nations, which rules, vigore divino. They draw the chariot of 
 
 Francis Lieber on Public War 
 
467 
their sovereignty, their protection and restraints on their conduct. Rules of 
modern of inter-national law, innate in human nature, drew directly from the 
fact of modern inter-national order and aimed at preserving it.60 Expressing 
the condition of humanity, their role was to promote its progressive 
vocation.61  
This progressive ideology was, as noted, explicit in the Code. The 
advancement of modern civilization was contingent on preserving a stable, 
regenerative order of nation States; the inter-national order was necessary to 
preclude the emergence of short-lived hegemonies and total war. Such order 
guaranteed a healthy constant, competition catalyzing human progress to 
counter the challenges of modern conditions.  
And so, war — a “human contest”62 — was a requisite of such a 
healthy competition among nations. Though he preferred peace to war, 
Lieber rejected pacifism and did not consider war as necessarily evil; he 
recognized the suffering it brings, but often expressed admiration for war’s 
virtues.63 His war theory saw war as a force that on occasion has served, and 
may again serve, virtue. Though it causes suffering, war may have a 
moralizing, and civilizing, effects on individuals and nations.64 War can 
 
civilization abreast, as the ancient steeds drew the car of victory”: L. R. Harley, 
Francis Lieber: His Life and Political Philosophy (1899), 142. See also Art. 30.  
60 Lieber, Definitions, supra note 36, § 20 (“the civilized nations of our race form a 
family of nations. If members of this family go to war with one another, they do not 
thereby divest themselves of the membership — neither toward the other members, 
nor wholly toward the enemy”). See also Baker, supra note 14, 246-247 (note 30). 
61 Thus, the State was “the state is a form and faculty of mankind to lead the species 
toward perfection”: Lieber, Political Ethics I, supra note 32, 183; and “International 
law is the greatest blessing of modern civilization, and every settlement of a principle 
in the law of nations is a distinct, plain step in the progress of humanity”: ‘Lieber to 
Sumner, Dec. 27, 1861’, in T. S. Perry, The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber (1882), 
324.  
62 F. Lieber, ‘The Duty of Provisional Governors’, New York Evening Post, 16 June 
1862, 1; Art. 15; and often in Lieber’s work; see also Childress, supra note 27, 47-48.  
63 He dismissed Peace Societies and the “principle of benevolence” they preached which 
“was considered to prohibit all violent contest, even wars of defence and resistance, 
even […] to acquire liberty”: F. Lieber, Law and Usages of War, No. I (1861-62), 
manuscript in Box 2, Folders 16-18, Eisenhower Library. Id., Political Ethics II, supra 
note 37, 632-633, 635. Elsewhere he testified he was “no vilifier of war under all 
circumstances”: ‘Lieber to Hillard, 18 April 1854’, in Perry, supra note 61, 270-271. 
See also Childress, supra note 27, 44; Freidel, Lieber, supra note 46, 223.  
64  Lieber, Political Ethics II, supra note 37, 634 et seq.; wars historically disseminated 
civilization and have caused “exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of 
knowledge […]”: id., 649; or “Blood has always flowed before great ideas could settle 
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bring nations “to their senses and makes them recover themselves” and, if 
just, often catalyse progress.65 Long peace, by the same token, can have 
corruptive, stifling effects.66  
For both war and peace had an inter-national function, and both were 
to be assessed in reference to that function. Lieber’s imperative for modern 
times was not perpetual peace, but the dynamic process of mankind’s 
progress and the advance of civilization.67 The value of peace and war 
depended on their effect on the stability of the modern inter-national order 
as a requisite for constant competition, their contribution to a dynamic 
interaction producing progress and fulfilling humanity’s vocation. Peace 
was crucial to this order and its stability; yet at times, peace could cause the 
inter-national society to wane, degenerate or disintegrate. Some wars could 
preserve or regenerate the inter-national order. War, for Lieber, was a 
necessary component of a dynamic process of human progress. 
Lieber’s law of war was aimed at enabling and preserving the same 
dynamic inter-national order as a prescription of human progress. War was 
not in itself immoral; rather, its morality drew largely on its service to the 
modern order of the age of nation States.68 Limiting war to the causes, ends, 
and hands of nations was, for Lieber, was aimed at preserving and 
stabilizing the inter-national order; this was indispensable for maintaining 
the conditions necessary for human civilization to progress towards 
perfection. His war definition expressed an ideological justification for the 
formation and existence of a modern world order for the age of nation 
States. Codifying, in inter-national law, State monopoly over the use of 
legitimate violence was an ideological imperative of progressive 
civilization.  
 
into actual institutions, or before the yearnings of humanity could become realities. 
Every marked struggle in the progress of civilization has its period of convulsion”: id., 
On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, Vol. I (1853), 26. See Childress, supra note 
27, 43-44.  
65 Freidel, Lieber, supra note 46, 299, 305. 
66 “Prolonged peace and worldly security and well-being” he wrote, “had thrown us into 
a trifling pursuit of life, a State of un-earnestness, had produced a lack of character, 
and loosened many a moral bond”: cited in Baxter, supra note 1, 178; Lieber, Political 
Ethics II, supra note 37, 645-646. 
67 Lieber considered On Perpetual Peace, one of Kant’s “weaker productions”: id., 653. 
68 Id., 640-650.  
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D. The Sources of Lieber’s Public War  
Before turning to the implications of Lieber’s war theory, it may be 
useful to take a short pause to ponder the historical, intellectual, and 
ideological sources that combined to form Lieber’s normative claim and 
ideological assertion about the public character of war.  
Lieber’s theories on man, society, the State, peace and war drew from 
a variety of historical sources and intellectual influences.69 In this respect, 
his eclecticism (and, perhaps, some lack of originality) was a virtue, not a 
weakness. It served him well as he “gathered seeds from the rich German 
harvest of his youth and planted them in America”.70 He was, as his 
biographer suggested, a “Transmitter of European Ideas to America”,71 
partaking in a transatlantic conversation.72 Many of his ideas traveled back a 
full circle; they were retransmitted back to Europe during his lifetime and 
long outlived their author, even the Code in which they were presented. 
Such was the case, we saw, with his public war doctrine.  
Tracing the intellectual sources of Lieber’s war definition is an elusive 
task.73 He left a few, if any, clues: in the Code itself, in the writings that 
surrounded its making, or in his other works. Nor did he compose a general 
treatise on international law. He was quite fond, with respect of the Code 
and other reforms he authored, of asserting the want of precedent or earlier 
guidance, notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the degree to which he 
had borrowed from his predecessors.74 His admiration for Grotius, and his 
 
69 C. B. Robson, ‘Francis Lieber’s Theories of Society, Government, and Liberty’, 4 
Journal of Politics (1942) 2, 227, 230 et seq. [Robson, Theories].  
70 Freidel, Lieber, supra note 46, 149 discussing Lieber, Political Ethics I, supra note 
32.  
71 F. B. Freidel, ‘Francis Lieber: Transmitter of European Ideas to America’, 38 Bulletin 
of the John Rylands Library (1956) 2, 342, 358 [Freidel, Transmitter].  
72 S. A. Samson, ‘Francis Lieber: Transatlantic Cultural Missionary’, in Mack & 
Lesesne, supra note 39, 129.  
73 Childress, supra note 27. Generally see C. B. Robson, ‘Papers of Francis Lieber, 3 
The Huntington Library Bulletin (1933) 1, 135 [Robson, Papers]. Some useful 
information on his German education can be gleaned from Curti, supra note 54, and 
E. Bruncken, ‘Francis Lieber: A Study of a Man and an Ideal’, 15 Deutsch-
Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter: Jahrbuch der Deutsch-Amerikanischen 
Historischen Gesellschaft von Illinois (1915), 7. 
74 Thus, he wrote to General Halleck on 20 February 1863: “I have earnestly endeavored 
to treat of these grave topics conscientiously and comprehensively; and you, well read 
in the literature of this branch of international law, know that nothing of this kind 
exists in any language. I had no guide, no groundwork, no text-book. I can assure you, 
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disdain for Vattel and Rousseau, is patent in his writing; these sentiments, 
however, or the traces of Kant or Burke and others are too general to help 
trace the sources of his public war theory.75  
Historical references, on the other hand, are not infrequent in his 
writing on the definition of war. This was his usual method, his ordinary 
style of writing. At times, these alluded to general European history.76 More 
often, his denunciation of private war referenced German history. He was 
familiar with the process and legal institutions (e.g. the landfriede) that 
gradually limited and prohibited private war in Germany and France;77 and 
the Thirty Years War looms large in his works as a warning against 
religious wars and private armies.78 Lieber seems to have reserved his 
strictest censure to those who undermined, throughout history, German 
unity: 
  
“‘Separatismus,’ as German historians have called the tendency 
of the German princes to make themselves as independent of the 
empire as possible, until their treason against the country 
reached ‘sovereignty’, has made the political history of 
Germany resemble the river Rhine, whose glorious water runs 
out in a number of shallow and muddy streamlets, having lost its 
imperial identity long before reaching the broad ocean.”79 
  
 
as a friend, that no counsellor of Justinian sat down to his task of the Digest with a 
deeper feeling of the gravity of his labor, than filled my breast in the laying down for 
the first time such a code, where nearly everything was floating. Usage, history, 
reason, and conscientiousness, a sincere love of truth, justice, and civilization have 
been my guides; but of course the whole must be still very imperfect”: Perry, supra 
note 61, 331.  
75 F. Lieber, History and Political Science: Necessary Studies in Free Countries (1858), 
an edited printout of his inaugural address at Columbia College (Grotius “immortal”) 
[Lieber, History and Political Science]; Harley, supra note 59, 126 and Freidel, 
Lieber, supra note 46, 154, 155 (note 27) (Rousseau); Childress, supra note 27, 59 
(note 82) (Vattel).  
76 See, e.g., the text quoted in text accompanying supra note 43.  
77 E.g. the Encyclopedia Americana entry, supra note 46, 65. B. Arnold, Princes and 
Territories in Medieval Germany (1991).  
78 Lieber, Definitions, supra note 36, § 19. See R. Bonney, The Thirty Year’s War: 1618-
1648 (2002); A. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (2005); G. Parker, The Thirty 
Years’ War, 2nd ed. (1997).  
79 Lieber, History and Political Science, supra note 75, 10.  
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Lieber’s republicanism comes across clearly in these historical 
references. Political forms such as “petty sovereigns”, recall, were “obsolete 
ideas, wholly insufficient for the demands of advanced civilization, and 
attempts at their renewal have led and must lead to ruinous results”.80 So do 
his beliefs in progress and the advantages of the modern world. Indeed, the 
juxtaposition of modern and earlier ages is a recurrent theme in the Code 
and his other works.81 Lieber’s use of historical sources confirms that his 
ideology, to a very large extent, stood at the source of his views on war.  
What of, then, of Lieber’s ardent nationalism? Did it have any 
influence on his public war definition? Consider the evidence. He was born 
in 1798.82 At eight, he became firsthand witnesses of Prussia’s collapse and, 
with it, the demise of the First Reich when watching French soldiers 
marching into Berlin in 1806. The Liebers were patriots, and Prussian 
guerilla leaders were his childhood heroes. He enrolled in a Gymnasium, a 
breeding ground for German nationalism, but was too young to join the 
1813 War of Liberation. Two of his brothers mustered. Age did not stop 
young Franz from taking a “most solemn oath […] that I should study 
French, enter the French army, come near to Napoleon’s person, and rid the 
earth of that son of crime and sin. I was then thirteen”.83 When Bonaparte 
escaped from Elba, Lieber obtained parental permission to join the Colberg 
regiment. He was wounded at Ligny and later again at Namur.  
Young Lieber was “one of those excited, nationalistic youths in 
Germany who […] agitated for German constitutionalism and unification”.84 
With Bonaparte removed, the newly formed German Confederation reneged 
on earlier promises of constitutional reform and popular participation; for 
Lieber’s generation, worse, it was a betrayal of the ideal of German 
unification by “scheming diplomatists”.85 In the next few years, Lieber can 
 
80 Supra note 51.  
81 Supra note 9; Lieber, History and Political Science, supra note 75, 9-10: “modern 
civilization stands in need of entire countries”; “moderns stand in need of nations and 
national longevity”.  
82 Freidel, Lieber, supra note 46, 1, 3 who notes that Lieber himself supplied 1800 as his 
year of birth. The biographical details in the next few paragraphs appear in most 
Lieber biographies.  
83 He was likely fifteen: id. The quote is from Perry, supra note 61, 298.  
84 Freidel, Transmitter, supra note 71, 344.  
85 ‘Lieber to Hammond, 14 February 1859’, in C. S. Phinney, Francis Lieber’s Influence 
on American Thought and Some of His Unpublished Letters (1918), 74: “Though I 
was but a lad when the Congress of Vienna mapped out a new Europe, especially a 
new Germany, I well remember how keenly it was felt that whole populations should 
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be found at the cradle of Vormärz German romantic nationalism: he became 
a Turner and an intimate of Turnvater Jahn. What prevented his 
Burschenschaften membership was not lack of sympathy but formal status: 
not yet a student, he could not be a member. Sympathize he did; he was a 
friend of Karl Ludwig Sand, a Burschenschaft member who in 1819 
murdered reactionary writer August von Kotzebue. The Carlsbad Decrees 
followed, dissolving both the student associations and the Turnerschaften; 
now a student, Lieber became the victim of persistent arrests, police 
persecution and harassment. These set the stage for his eventual departure 
from Germany, first to England, then in 1927 to America. And although the 
young liberal would in time turn republican, the radical become a 
conservative, he remained a keen supporter of German unification — by 
force if need be — for the rest of his life.86 
Lieber’s biographers all recognize the cardinal influence which his 
German youth, and of the ideals and ideas he brought from Germany, had 
on the theories he would elaborate in the United States and on the Code he 
wrote during the American Civil War. This was the case, in particular, with 
his nationalism.87 The German chapter of his biography makes a far more 
plausible source for his concept of modern war than the Civil War. It is true 
that the Code arose out of the needs of the Civil War. Some provisions 
reflect, clearly, the Civil War settings.88 Nonetheless, the Code only 
elaborated a public war theory Lieber had first discussed in the Manual of 
Political Ethics — written two decades before the war. When requested to 
opine on the status and treatments of irregular Confederate forces, Lieber 
wrote Guerilla Parties where he treated regular, not “public”, war only in 
 
be given and taken like chattel, not by simple conquest, but by scheming 
diplomatists.”  
86 D. Clinton, Tocqueville, Lieber, and Bagehot: Liberalism Confronts the World (2003), 
53-54, 116. The Franco-Prussian War and the Unification of Germany were, for 
Lieber, the realization of a lifelong dream: Francis Lieber, ‘The Value of Plebiscitum 
in International Law’ (1871), in Gilman, supra note 13, 301; Curti, supra note 54, 
267, 277.  
87 Id. 
88 Like the provisions concerning slavery, or the status of consuls. The ‘American’ thesis 
of the Code’s influence is synthesized by his chief biographer: “Like so much of 
Lieber’s earlier work it grew out of American experience, in this instance in the 
conduct of the war, which led Lieber to lay down precepts and generalizations. These 
he buttressed with learned reference to the European authorities on international law”: 
Freidel, Transmitter, supra note 71, 358. Freidel, however, also recognized the extent 
of his German and European experience: supra note 70.  
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passing. His analysis in that pamphlet was, moreover, grounded in European 
precedent, not American experience.89  
None of this shows direct, positive influence of Lieber’s biography on 
his elaboration of modern war as public war. Still, the evidence 
demonstrates a very high degree of resonance between the German 
sensibilities of his youth and his mature war definition. Put differently, it is 
hard not to see the connection between the limitation of the war entitlement 
to nation States pursuing national ends and Lieber’s concerns for German 
unification. It is equally hard not to identify his nationalism, or 
republicanism as explanations for his rejection of the private in war. It is 
hard, finally, to separate his early concerns with German nation- and state-
building with the significance he would assign to the “formation and 
coexistence of modern nations” (Art. 30). If we disregard his romanticism, 
we cannot hope to understand his determination that only nations, and only 
a dynamic competition between nation States, can meet requirements of the 
modern age. In the final analysis, whatever the precise historical or 
intellectual sources of Lieber’s public war definition, it was an ideological 
assertion driven by ideological convictions.  
E. Rethinking Public and Private War  
This reflection on Lieber’s public war theory raises a myriad of new 
questions, directing attention to new horizons of inquiry. If it offers a 
somewhat richer historical understanding of the interstate paradigm now 
dominating the law governing restraint in war, it also compels its historical, 
normative, and policy reconsideration. Lieber’s ideology has little 
resonance, perhaps, with present-day international law. The construction of 
war to which it gave rise, however, lives on in extant norms. Whatever 
ideology underscores present-day norms affecting the jus in bello 
entitlement to wage war, there is something disconcerting in the realization 
that norms are so permeable to ideology. If the interstate paradigm can 
 
89 F. Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of 
War (1862), in Hartigan, supra note 47, 30, 33. I found no reference in Lieber’s 
writing to early American manifestations of a republican public war doctrine, e.g. the 
Neutrality Act: An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, 5 June 1794, 1 United States Statutes at Large 381, 383. 
See J. Lobel, ‘The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and 
Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy’, 24 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1983) 1, 1.  
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today be defended by contemporary notions of humanitarianism or human 
dignity; and, with equal force, by early 19th Century romantic nationalism or 
republicanism, then we ought to examine, in the very least, the role of 
ideology in shaping, or justifying, present day international law.  
Today, Lieber’s public war ideology serves as a reminder that 
international legal humanitarianism remains limited, with notable but few 
exceptions, to restraining political violence by one class of participants. This 
reminder somewhat dampens IHL’s “quest for universal application”,90 or 
bolder assertions that IHL’s material scope of application has in fact become 
universal. IHL’s universality, if achieved to whatever degree, seems to have 
been made possible by fiddling with definitions of what constitutes “war”. 
This reminder also suggests that appraising IHL’s record of achievement in 
restraining war to-date must also account for political violence left out of 
such definition. What forms of large-scale organized political violence 
applied for private ends, or non-state public ends, escape regulation and 
restraint?91 Is private war dead, or does it persist, under other names or, at 
times, with some “public” justification?  
Lieber’s public war ideology informs, likewise, a broader historical 
appraisal of modern legal restraints on war. Today, we saw, Lieber’s public 
war theory is embedded in the assumption that restraint starts with, and is 
possible by, limiting legitimate violence to States. This may be true insofar 
as divesting the State of its war monopoly would, in all likelihood, 
guarantee a return to bellum omnium contra omne. States may be equipped 
with such characteristics that enable them to monitor and ensure compliance 
with restraints: hierarchy, bureaucracy, discipline, resources, etc. These are 
the characteristics that made the modern State such a successful form of 
political organization. Yet, as Charles Tilly observed, these very 
characteristics, alas, also gave the modern State the propensity to wage war: 
“War made the state, and the state made war”.92 The record of the 20th 
Century undermines Lieber’s confidence that codifying the war monopoly 
of the nation State would guarantee against wars for “trifling or unjust 
 
90 G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Specificities of Humanitarian Law’, in C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies 
and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour 
of Jean Pictet (1984), 265, 267.  
91 Even if such violence may be regulated by other international law regimes: S. R. 
Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’, 111 
Yale Law Journal (2001) 3, 443.  
92 C. Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of European State-Making’, in id., (ed.), The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), 3, 42.  
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causes”, or that wars would be waged only for the common good. His 
optimism that modern national wars would be less frequent, protracted, and 
destructive today seems, at best, irredeemably naïve. The prevalence of 
intrastate violence in our times only adds concerns of centralized, 
legitimized means of violence. Limiting legitimate violence to States alone, 
clearly, comes at a cost. Lieber’s war theory also serves as a reminder that 
that cost requires constant reappraisal.  
Tilly’s interpretation of the rise of the modern State points to another 
salient inquiry. The Lieber Code, his public war definition, and republican 
ideology all stress the formation of modern States and nations. On this basis, 
Lieber proceeded to recognize in the modern nation State a legitimate 
monopoly of force. This resonates with Weber’s definition of the State in 
Politics As a Vocation, a lecture he gave in 1918 or 1919: 
 
“Today the relation between the state and violence is an 
especially intimate one […] Today [...] we have to say that a 
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory 
[...] Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical 
force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the 
extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the 
sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.”93 
  
Weber prescribed the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a 
given territory; Lieber’s public war theory, by contrast, legitimized State 
monopoly of the use of external force. Weber described a conceptual 
definition of the State;94 Lieber advanced it as a normative, and ideological, 
assertion. But the intimate relation of state-making and war-making is also 
historically grounded:95 
 
93 M. Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in B. S. Turner (ed.), From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (1991), 77-78. 
94 Though he was aware of its historical manifestations: id. Notably, he was influenced 
by Georg Jellinek’s theory of the state: see D. Kelly, The State of the Political: 
Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and 
Franz Neumann (2003); J. Seitzer, Comparative History and Legal Theory: Carl 
Schmitt in the First German Democracy (2001), 29-30; M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (2002), 198 et 
seq.  
95 C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P. Evans, D. 
Rueschemeyer & T. Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (1985), 169. 




“Over most of European history, ordinary men [...] have 
commonly had lethal weapons at their disposal [...] local and 
regional powerholders have ordinarily had control of 
concentrated means of force that could, if combined, match or 
even overwhelm those of the State. For a long time, nobels [...] 
had a legal right to wage private war. Since the seventeenth 
century, nevertheless, rulers have managed to shift the balance 
decisively against both individual citizens and rival 
powerholders within their own states. They made it criminal, 
unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear 
arms, have outlawed private armies, and have made it seem 
normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed 
civilians.”96  
 
In Tilly’s and Weber’s accounts, law had a cardinal role in state-
formation: to legitimize State monopoly of the means of violence. Lieber’s 
public war theory implies that international law, too, may have had some 
role, conceptual and historical, in the formation of modern States (and of 
modern world order). If war-making and state-making are closely related, 
what role did international law play in state-making through war? What role 
did it play in war-making by the State? Did it only move, as the Code’s 
language and timing implies, to legitimize States’ war monopoly of violence 
once their monopoly of violence was firmly established internally? Or did 
international law affect the process, long before the 19th Century, of force 
concentration that produced the modern State? Both Weber and Tilly 
suggest that exploring, and perhaps collapsing, the private/public war 
distinction is a useful starting point in the search for these questions.  
Contemporary international legal scholarship hardly addresses these 
questions. Private war is not a topic familiar to students of international law. 
It rarely is given an index entry in international law textbooks, even tomes 
dedicated to international legal history. The latter, at best, allude to it 
cryptically en passant.97 Rethinking public and private war promises, 
however, a deeper understanding of the formation, driving forces, and the 
 
96 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1992 (1992), 69. 
97 In addition to Neff, supra note 10, the following offer little help on private war: A. 
Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, rev. ed. (1954). W. G. Grewe, 
The Epochs of International Law, transl. & rev. by M. Byres (2000); J. H. W. Verzijl, 
International Lawin Historical Perspective, Vol. II: International Persons (1969).  
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significance of modern international law. It may lead some to revisit the 
history of international law, perhaps even its theory of sources and subjects. 
Rethinking public and private war can likewise add much to contemporary 
debates on the pros and cons of regulating violence by non-state actors, or 
on the merit and pitfalls of applying IHL rules to privatized warfare, or on 
the adequacy of IHL.  
F. Conclusion  
Lieber’s public war definition was a conceptual base and controlling 
principle of the systematic positive regulation of restraints in war he 
elaborated in the 1863 Code. It was the source for restraining the conduct of 
belligerents, but at the same time for license. As such, it became a 
foundational concept of the 19th Century project to modernize the laws of 
war. Today, it remains embedded, albeit implicit, in contemporary 
international humanitarian law which views war, paradigmatically, as 
interstate war.  
Yet for Lieber, State monopoly of the external use of force was far 
more than a normative claim. It was driven by the ideological sensibilities of 
Lieber’s youth in Vormärz Germany: romantic nationalism, ardent 
republicanism, and profound faith in modernity and progress. The public 
character of war and its normative consequences were, for Lieber, 
ideological assertions. These sought to justify the modern nation State, its 
formation and existence. Lieber’s public war definition, however, also 
sought to construct and justify, in ideological terms, the formation, 
existence, and preservation of an international order comprised of nation 
States. The inter-national order was “the great safeguards of our 
civilization”. The inter-national order guaranteed a healthy constant, 
competition catalyzing human progress to counter the challenges of modern 
conditions. It was indispensable for maintaining the conditions necessary for 
human civilization to progress towards perfection. Lieber tasked inter-
national law with preserving that inter-national order. Codifying State 
monopoly over the use of legitimate violence was an ideological imperative 
of progressive civilization in the modern age.  
